# Browser fingerprinting

(how did we get here)



### **SecAppDev**

February 2014

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www.securitee.org

### echo 'whoami'

- Postdoctoral researcher at KU Leuven
- Working, mainly, on web security and privacy
- Identify online ecosystems
  - Players
  - Interactions
  - Common patterns
- Search for systematic problems and solutions





### 1993



©The New Yorker Collection 1993 Peter Steiner From cartoonbank.com. All rights reserved.

"On the Internet, nobody knows you're a dog."


### I need state!

- HTTP is a stateless protocol
  - The server does not know that two or requests originate from the same user

- No state -> No Personalization
  - No e-banking, e-shops, webmail, etc.

Solution: Cookies!







"One of the great challenges that faces the financial future of journalism is, how can you begin

MOST E-MAILED

MOST VIEWED

### A cookie's life



red.com









# 3<sup>rd</sup> Party Tracking


- "Suddenly" all sorts of websites that you've never heard about, can create a browsing profile of you and sell it to advertising companies
  - quantserve.com
  - scorecardresearch.com
  - addthis.com




### Users reacted...

- 1/3 of users delete first & third-party cookies within a month after they've been setup
- Multiple extensions revealing hidden trackers
  - Ghostery
  - Lightbeam
- Private mode of browsers used to avoid traces of cookies from certain websites

# Ghostery



# Lightbeam



### **EU Cookie law**

"Member States shall ensure that the storing of information, or the gaining of access to information already stored, in the terminal equipment of a subscriber or user is only allowed on condition that the subscriber or user concerned has given his or her consent, having been provided with clear and comprehensive information, in accordance with Directive 95/46/EC, inter alia, about the purposes of the processing. This shall not prevent any technical storage or access for the sole purpose of carrying out the transmission of a communication over an electronic communications network, or as strictly necessary in order for the provider of an information society service explicitly requested by the subscriber or user to provide the service."

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The Register uses cookies. Some may have been set already. Read about managing our cookies.

Please click the button to accept our cookies. If you continue to use the site, we'll assume you're happy to accept the cookies anyway.



Cookies helpen ons bij het leveren van onze diensten. Door gebruik te maken van onze diensten, gaat u akkoord met ons gebruik van cookies.

OK

Meer informatie

#### Care for a cookie or two?




Here at Bluehost, we want you to have the most relevant customer experience possible. That's why we use cookies – they help remember log-ins and optimize the content you see based on your interests and preferences.

AGREE AND PROCEED

Find out more about the cookies we use on this website »

# Belgium?





of information, y stored, in the only allowed on



NEWS ▼ Topics / TECHNOLOGY COOKIES EU EUROPEAN UNION


### Compliance with EU cookie law could cost the UK £10 billion

or as information societ subscriber or user




The stupid EU cookie law (and why it should die)

# Money making





# = PROBLEM



### However...



- What if you could track users without the need of cookies or any other stateful client-side identifier?
  - Hidden from users
  - Hard to avoid it / opt-out

### Web-based device fingerprinting


- Eckersley showed in 2010 that certain attributes of your browsing environment can be used to accurately track you
- These attributes, when combined, created a quite unique fingerprint of your system?
  - How?

# Properties fingerprinted by Panopticlick
















# Resulting fingerprints



 94.2% of the users with Flash/Java could be uniquely identified

 Simple heuristic algorithms could track updates of the same browser

## Other proposed ways

- Eckersley paved the way of stateless tracking through fingerprinting
- After Eckersley, other researchers proposed ways of fingerprinting browsers, based on:
  - Speed
  - Implementation coverage
  - Rendering of elements



# They will know you by your speed...

- Mowery et al. (W2SP 2011) proposed the use of performance benchmarks to tell different JavaScript engines apart
  - Different JavaScript engine -> Different browser
- Collected performance signatures (39 tests) from approx. 1000 users
  - 98.2% correct browser family detection
  - Overall accuracy (versions included): 79.8%



# As well as your features...

- Mulazzani et al. (W2SP 2013) proposed the use of missing functionality in JavaScript engines
  - Different browsers, implement JavaScript standards, at a different rate

Browser	Win 7	WinXP	Mac OS X
Firefox 3.6.26	3955	3955	3955
Firefox 4	290	290	290
Firefox 5	264	264	264
Firefox 6	214	214	214
Firefox 7	190	190	190



## As well as your artistic talent

- Mowery et al. (W2SP) proposed the use of the HTML5 canvas to detect browser-specific renderings of the same string
  - Write some text in canvas, read it out as an image
  - Different browsers/hardware combinations will create slightly different images

– http://jsbin.com/ePAheCi/2/edit



## ADS

#### Feds Are Suspects in New Malware That Attacks Tor Anonymity

BY KEVIN POULSEN 08.05.13 3:57 AM

Follow @kpoulsen





### **EU Cookie law**

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### Does it apply to fingerprinting?

# What's happening out there?

 In mid 2012, all we knew is that fingerprinting is possible and that a small number of companies offer it as a service

- Questions that begged answering:
  - How are they doing it?
  - Could they do more?
  - Who is using them?
  - How are users trying to hide?
    - Is it working?

# Manual analysis of 3 fingerprinting companies



### Threat Metrix...



- Find the domains that they use to serve their fingerprinting scripts
- 2. Find some websites that use them and extract the code
- 3. De-obfuscate and analyze
- 4. Compare and classify

```
dow.io_bb_callback:__if_d;_i_c(_if_fa,_if_fb);}var__i_d={__if_p:function(_if_fc){return__if__
l(_if_fc.getUTCDate(),2)+" "+this.__if_ad(_if_fc.getUTCHours(),2)+":"+this.__if_ad(_if_fc.get
'_i_e=_if_fd.toString(16);return(_i_m)?this.__if_ad(_i_e,_i_m):_i_e;},__if_u:function(_i_bz)
odeAt(_i_g);if(_i_h>=56320&&_i_h<57344)continue;if(_i_h>=55296&&_i_h<56320){if(_i_g+1>=_i_bz.
.nue;_i_h=((_i_h-55296)<<10)+(s-56320)+65536;}if(_i_h<128)_i_f+=String.fromCharCode(_i_h);els
f+=String.fromCharCode(224+(_i_h>>12),128+((_i_h>>6)&63),128+(_i_h&63));else _i_f+=String.fr
ırn _i_f;},__if_y:function(_if_fe){if(typeof(encodeURIComponent)=="function")return encodeURI
length;_i_g++){var _i_k=_i_j.charAt(_i_g);var _i_l=new RegExp("[a-zA-Z0-9-_.!~*'()]");_i_f+=
ınction(_i_bz,_if_ff){var _i_m="";var _i_n=_if_ff-_i_bz.length;while(_i_m.length<_i_n)_i_m+="
"JKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789+/=",__if_aj:function(_i_bz){var _i_e="
i_bz.charCodeAt(_i_g+1);var _i_r=_i_bz.charCodeAt(_i_g+2);var _i_s=_i_p>>2;var _i_t=((_i_p&3
/=<mark>64;}else if</mark>(isNaN(_i_r)){_i_v=<mark>64;}</mark>_i_e=_i_e+this._i_ej.charAt(_i_s)+this._i_ej.charAt(_i_t)
ınction(_i_bz){var _i_w="";var _i_x,chr2,chr3="";var _i_s,_i_t,_i_u,_i_v="";var _i_g=0;var _i
indexOf(_i_bz.charAt(_i_g++));_i_t=this._i_ej.indexOf(_i_bz.charAt(_i_g++));_i_u=this._i_ej.
!)|(_i_t>>4);chr2=((_i_t&15)<<4)|(_i_u>>2);chr3=((_i_u&3)<<6)|_i_v;_i_w=_i_w+<mark>String</mark>.fromCharC
ing.fromCharCode(chr3);_i_x=chr2=chr3="";_i_s=_i_t=_i_u=_i_v="";}while(_i_g<_i_bz.length);re
el:12,_i_em:false,_i_en:"",_i_eo:"",_i_ep:true};if(typeof(window.io_install_stm)!="boolean")w
v.io_install_flash=_i_z._i_em;if(typeof(window.io_exclude_stm)!="<mark>number"</mark>)window.io_exclude_st
ub_url===undefined)window.io_stm_cab_url=_i_o.__if_aq("aHR0cHM6Ly9tcHNuYXJlLmllc25hcmUuY29t")
.l_stm_error_handler===undefined)window.io_install_stm_error_handler=_i_z._i_en;if
needs_update_handler===undefined)window.io_flash_needs_update_handler=_i_z._i_eo;if(typeof(w
<code>'unction(_if_fg){if(_if_fg===undefined)return</code> null; <code>if(typeof(_if_fg)=="object"&&_if_fg.tagNam"</code>
tElementsByName(_if_fg);for(var _i_g=0;_i_g<_i_ab.length;_i_g++)if(_i_ab[_i_g]._i_dc&&_i_ab[
```

<u>return;}var \_i\_b=\_i\_aa.getElementById(window.io\_bbout\_element\_id);\_i\_b["value"]=\_if\_fa;}func</u>

### Results

- After extracting all features, we created a taxonomy of all fingerprinted features, and compared each company to Panopticlick
- Collectively, Panopticlick was fully covered

Browser customizations

Browser-level User Conf.

**Browser Family & Version** 

**OS & Applications** 

Hardware & Network

**ActiveX + CLSIDs** 

**DNT Choice** 

Math constants

**Windows Registry** 

**TCP/IP Parameters** 

### Non-trivial extras

- Non-plugin font detection
  - Comparison of text's width & height
- Native Fingerprinting plugins
  - Accessing highly-specific registry value
- Fingerprint delivery mechanisms
- Proxy detection


## Font Detection through JavaScript

String	<u>Dimensions</u>
I_DO_NOT_NEED_FLASH	500 x 84
I_DO_NOT_NEED_FLASH	520 x 84
I_DO_NOT_NEED_FLASH	580 x 87
I_DO_NOT_NEED_FLASH	399 x 82

### Non-trivial extras

- Non-plugin font detection
  - Comparison of text's width & height
- Native Fingerprinting plugins
  - Accessing highly-specific registry values
- Fingerprint delivery mechanisms
- Proxy detection

# Proxy-detection



### Demo



http://www.orbitz.com

## Adoption

#### Dataset A


 Crawled top 10,000 sites, searching for inclusions from the 3 fingerprint providers

- 40 sites discovered
  - Porn & dating sites most prominent
    - Shared credentials & Sybil attacks
  - skype.com the highest ranking one

### Adoption

#### Dataset B

- 3,804 domains from Wepawet



### But wait... there's more!

- Can we find unknown fingerprinting parties?
  - How do we separate a fingerprinting script from a generic analytics script?

#### Fonts!

- Separating feature between normal analytics and fingerprinting
- Second most identifying feature according to Eckersley

#### **FPDetective**

- Fingerprinting-sensitive crawler
  - If fonts are touched, record site

- Detection of font snooping
  - JS-based font probing (Modified browser)
  - Flash-based font probing (decompilation of Flash)



# Adoption (revisited)

#### Dataset A

 Crawled top 10,000 sites, searching for inclusions from the 3 fingerprint providers

- 40 sites discovered
  - Porn & dating sites most prominent
    - Shared credentials & Sybil attacks
  - skype.com the highest ranking one

# Adoption (revisited)

#### Dataset A

- 145 fingerprinting sites in the top Alexa 10K
   DNT does not matter
  - Shared credentials & Sybil attacks
  - skype.com the highest ranking one

### Status

- Fingerprinting is out there
  - Quite a number of new techniques over Panopticlick
- Large and popular sites are using them
- Could they be doing more?
  - How do the browser internals relate to a browser's identity?

# **DIY Fingerprinting**



- We decided to try some fingerprinting of our own
- Focus on the two special JS objects that fingerprinters probe the most:
  - navigator
  - screen
- Perform a series of everyday operations and search for differences across browsers
  - Add properties
  - Remove properties
  - Modify properties

### Novel methods discovered

 E.g., Natural ordering of properties can give away a browser family, and occasionally, a browser version

navigator.geolocation navigator.onLine navigator.cookieEnabled navigator.vendorSub navigator.vendor navigator.appCodeName navigator.appName navigator.appVersion navigator.language navigator.mimeTypes ← navigator.appCodeName

navigator.appName navigator.appMinorVersion navigator.cpuClass navigator.platform







### Status

- Fingerprinting is out there
  - Quite a number of new techniques over Panopticlick
- Large and popular sites are using them
- There could be more fingerprinting done by the companies
- How could a user react?

#### **Browser extensions**



- Reviewed 11 different browser extensions that spoof a browser's user-agent
  - 8 Firefox + 3 Chrome
  - More than 800,000 users
- Advice to use such extensions:
  - Previous research in web tracking
  - Underground hacking guides
- How do they stand-up against fingerprinting?



# Worse than nothing...

- All of them had one or more of the following:
  - Incomplete coverage of the navigator object
  - Impossible configurations
  - Mismatch between UA header and UA property

- latrogenic problem:
  - When installing these, a user becomes more visible and more fingerprintable than before

### Case Study



#### User Agent Switcher 0.7.3

by chrispederick

The User Agent Switcher extension adds a menu and a toolbar button to switch the user agent of a browser.





187 user reviews 463,293 users ដាំ

- Add to collection
- Share this Add-on

#### Stats

- 463,293 users
- 187 user reviews
- 4/5 starts



## Worse than nothing...

**Fingerprintable** done or more of the following: **Surface** Incomplete coveExtension\_A the navigator object Impossible configur Mismatch Extension B Extension C visible and more fingerprintable than before

## Defenses (today)

- The more generic your system is, the better
  - The more exotic plugins and extensions you have installed, the more chances of being singled out
- Fingerprinters can be black-listed
- Disabling Flash and Java will definitely help
  - No explicit font collection
- Virtual machines? Browsers from a stick?
  - Depends on your balance between hassle and privacy

### Conclusion

- Web tracking is so much more than cookies
- Fingerprinting is a real problem
- Browsers are so complex that it is really hard to make them seem identical
- Current browser extensions should not be used for privacy reasons
- Long term solutions will most-likely not be pure technical ones
  - Legislation required, like in stateful tracking

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by Nitrozac & Snaggy





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